

FULL STOP

THE BOUNDARY OF A PRESENTED RECORD

A boundary applied to a fixed written form, the reading that follows, and every later explanation of that transition

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ABSTRACT

This paper isolates a narrow operational boundary for written records. Given a fixed earlier record and a later record, it asks only which written material was literally present before the later record appeared. If the first record is “breathing” and a later record says “breathing continues,” the word “continues” is not counted as part of the first record merely because it was later read or written.

The cut does not establish a referent, meaning, consciousness, a body, a world, or what is happening, and it makes no population-level claim. Any explanation — including “meaning,” “the brain,” “science proved it,” a number, or a formula — enters as a later record and receives the same cut. Scientific literature informs the design of the self-check instructions and limits the related claims made here; it does not serve as an external judge of the record boundary. The boundary applies to every presented word or symbol, including a record of a justified inference: justification does not turn the writing into what it names.

The novelty claim does not concern the general observation that a word is not the thing it names, first-person deixis, indexical dependence, or established distinctions among what is said, presupposed, implicated, and inferred. It concerns the full operational configuration: fixed record → later material appearing in reading → literal-presence check against the earlier record → recursive application to every explanation of the transition → no privileged terminal arbiter. Locating earlier work with the same full configuration defeats or narrows the claim. The minimal cut uses “I”; the recursive name/named cut uses “love” → “feeling”; the primary transition pass holds “me” fixed under different presented speaker positions; the neutral lexical control uses “sanction.” The “me” pass does not claim that the pronoun changes lexical meaning: if the same form is taken to pick out different presented speakers, those names are not written inside “me.” Co-variation between the prior record and what appears in reading does not by itself establish the cause of the transition.

THE LAST WORD IS STILL A WORD.

1. THE OBJECT OF THE PAPER

The subject is deliberately narrower than a theory of language: two fixed written forms and their presentation order. “Record” is a working term for a region of paper, a screen, or a preserved file that can be presented again. It is not treated as an exempt entity.

The paper does not begin by asking what the record “means.” It separates material literally present in the earlier form from material that arrives only in later reading, response, or explanation. If an answer requires another written form, that form is already the next presented material.

2. STATUS OF THE CENTRAL CUT

The central cut is not presented as a statistical prediction about people, and it does not require a worldview or disciplinary label. It is an accounting rule for the contents of a fixed record: later written material is not treated as having been literally present in an earlier record merely because it was subsequently read out of it.

Each concrete application remains checkable. An application fails if material called “later” is already literally present in the preserved earlier record; if presentation order is not fixed; if the earlier record was altered so that the boundary cannot be reconstructed; or if the procedure itself substitutes a later description for the event or object that description names. These are local failure conditions for an application, not an attempt to turn the cut into an experiment about the world.

READING THE NEXT THING OUT OF THE FIRST IS NOT THE SAME AS SHOWING THE NEXT THING INSIDE THE FIRST.

3. THE PRIMARY CUT

1. Present one short written form on its own card, page, or screen.
2. Point to where it is visible. Do not begin by asking for a definition.
3. Allow reading to happen. Do not try to switch meaning off.
4. If a word, sentence, or explanation appears, optionally write it on a separate record only after it appears. If nothing appears, draw no conclusion.
5. Place the earlier and later records side by side. Do not ask which is “truer.”
6. Ask only: where was the later written material presented in the earlier record before the later record appeared?
7. Turn every explanation of the answer into the next input to the same cut.

Three questions are kept distinct here: what is literally presented in the earlier record; how a reading was subsequently recorded separately; and what relation to a named object or event is attributed to that reading. A written response is not treated as an exhaustive account of reading. Comparing letters establishes only the contents of the records; it does not settle whether the attributed relation is justified or rule out contextual grounds.

Step-by-step online self-check: <https://beforeword.xyz/research/full-stop/check/en/> . It reveals the presentations step by step and allows the reader to continue without a response. The self-check PDF provides instructions for presenting separate cards. The examples and explanations in this paper are for examining the procedure. Neither the online pass nor the PDF instructions constitute independent experimental evidence or a study of social effects.

4. KEY PASSES

Minimal cut: “I”

I

Begin with the presented record only. It contains the written form “I.” The word “person” is not written inside it. This establishes only the literal content: the absence of another written form does not establish an absence of meaning, reference, or contextual grounds for an act of reference. Nor does it establish that a person exists or does not exist.

WHERE, IN THE BODY, IS THIS WRITTEN FORM ITSELF? AND WHERE IS WHATEVER APPEARS WHEN YOU READ IT?

If “person,” “self,” “speaker,” “consciousness,” “meaning,” or “the brain” appears in reading, preserve each continuation separately as later written material. The question “where is the person?” is itself another record and receives the same cut.

“love” → “feeling”: the name and what it names

love

First present “love” on its own, without a question about its meaning or a subsequent word. If a response arises and the reader chooses to write it down, preserve it separately. Only then compare the written form, the recorded reading, and any claim about what it refers to. “feeling” below is the next example for examination, not a required response to the first pass.

feeling

In the next pass, present “feeling” separately and preserve any response that is written down. The name and what it names are considered separately: the appearance of a name does not by itself establish the presence or absence of what it names. The absence of the word “feeling” from the record “love” establishes only a difference in literal content;

it does not establish an absence of feeling during reading. If “experience,” “body,” “brain,” “hormones,” or “state” is subsequently written down, preserve each continuation separately. The grounds for an act of reference and the presence of what is named require separate examination.

“breathing”

breathing

If “breathing continues” appears later, the paper does not turn that sentence into breathing or use it as evidence of what is happening. It records only the boundary of the written material: “continues” was not written in the first presentation.

“thinking,” “thought,” “intelligence,” “consciousness”

t h i n k i n g

Which presented form began to perform the activity read as “thinking”? Replies such as “the brain,” “neurons,” “processing,” or “representation” are not forbidden and do not become terminal explanations; they are later records.

Mathematical notation

| | | | |

Do not translate this surface into a numeral in order to validate the primary cut. “five,” “number,” “count,” the symbol “5,” and a formula are later written forms. They can be used for a separate technical task; they do not become judges of the initial presentation here.

5. CALIBRATION: LATER CONTENT CAN FOLLOW FROM A SOURCE WITHOUT BEING LITERAL SOURCE TEXT

Presupposition and implicature are not presented here as discoveries of FULL STOP. Language research has already developed the distinction between what is said and what is conveyed or presupposed. [17–19] These cases calibrate the cut: material can be strongly licensed by a source without being a literal substring of the source. The procedure must preserve that narrower distinction without treating “not literally written” as “false” or “arbitrary.”

Presupposition

John stopped smoking.

A standard reading recovers the background content “John used to smoke”: change-of-state predicates such as “stop” are well-established presupposition triggers, and readers recover the presupposed content as part of interpretation. [13] FULL STOP does not deny that presupposition or call it false. It asks a narrower question: was the later record “John used to smoke” literally present in the source sentence?

John used to smoke.

If the reply is “that was presupposed,” then “presupposed” is the next presented description. The cut does not dispute the presupposition; it does not rewrite it backward as literal source text.

Scalar implicature

Some applications were approved.

In suitable contexts, “some” commonly gives rise to a “not all” reading, but the strength of that inference varies systematically with context. [14] A later record such as “not all applications were approved” can therefore be pragmatically well-grounded without being literal material in the source sentence.

Not all applications were approved.

This pass shows only that the procedure can keep literal source material apart from later inferential material. That distinction is not unique to FULL STOP; the closest earlier approaches are discussed below.

LATER CONTENT CAN FOLLOW FROM A SOURCE WITHOUT HAVING BEEN LITERALLY WRITTEN IN IT.

5.1. An inference remains a record

Letters assembled into words do not become what they name. The boundary applies to every presented written form: a word, number, symbol, definition, rule, or inference. “Meaning,” “reference,” “proof,” “verification,” and “what is happening” receive no exemption. Writing them does not by itself present the named relation, action, or event.

Section 5 considers later content as a potentially justified inference. The same cut now applies to the inference itself. If “John used to smoke” is written, this record is what is presented for examination. Grounds for that reading can be supplied and examined; this does not turn the sentence into John’s smoking. Justifying an inference does not make its written form identical to what it names.

To repeat the procedure, preserve the source record, the recorded inference, and the recorded attribution of status separately. Identify the exact passage read as grounds for the inference. Then preserve the definitions, rules, and verification material cited in the explanation. Each addition expands the presented material; none ceases to be a record when accepted as justified. If the inference was already written in the source, mark its literal presence there: the general boundary still applies.

“Meaning” is also presented here as a written word. A written definition or explanation of meaning is a further record to which the same procedure applies. An appeal to meaning does not exempt a record from this boundary. Writing “there is meaning” or “there is no meaning” does not, by itself, establish the presence or absence of what is named.

The distinction between the writing and what it names does not, by itself, determine whether a particular reading is justified. This distinction itself, like the sentence “an inference remains a record,” is presented in words and receives the same examination. The word “boundary” does not establish this claim merely by appearing in the text.

5.2. One boundary across different fields

“Biology,” “physics,” “law,” and the other names of fields are also presented here as words. Assigning a record to a field does not exempt it from the procedure: preserve the writing, present each addition separately, identify the attributed relation, and repeat the examination for the explanation itself.

The following records are constructed teaching examples. Any images, documents, or data mentioned are proposed additions to the exercise; no actual observational material, case documents, or calculations are supplied here.

For each pass, specify in advance the material to be examined: the source record, a specific addition, and the recorded attribution of status. Adding grounds can change whether a reading is justified. It does not turn the writing into what it names. Material absent from the selected set is not declared absent altogether.

Biology

The cell is dividing

The sentence does not become the cell division it describes.

What is added. If “the images show this” is added, preserve the images, captions, and presentation order separately. The phrase alone supplies neither the images nor the observation it names.

Repeat the examination. Identify which features in which material are read as cell division. The written explanation also remains part of the material being examined.

Chemistry

H₂O

The formula does not become the substance.

What is added. If “water” is written beside it or an analysis of a sample is supplied, preserve this as an addition. The name of the substance does not become the sample, and a record of an analytical result does not become the act of carrying out the analysis.

Repeat the examination. Present the formula, the sample description, and the grounds for relating them separately. Repeat the examination for the conclusion “the composition is confirmed.”

Physics

The body is moving

The statement about motion does not become the body’s motion.

What is added. If coordinates and times are supplied as grounds, preserve the values, units, chosen frame of reference, and description of the measurement.

Repeat the examination. Identify the rule used to derive the conclusion from these records. The rule itself, the written conclusion, and the verification record are subject to the same examination.

Law

A crime was committed

The claim about a crime does not become the event it describes.

What is added. Preserve the report, the material supplied, and the text of any decision separately. The labels “evidence” and “decision” do not replace those materials.

Repeat the examination. Identify where a claim about an event is recorded and where a decision concerning it is recorded. A document can play a part in an action; the conditions and consequences of its use are examined separately. Its involvement does not make the text identical to the event it describes.

Philosophy

Existence

The word does not become whatever is said to exist.

What is added. If a definition, distinction, or argument is added, preserve it separately. The words “grounds” and “proved” are also presented as records.

Repeat the examination. Identify the exact passage read as grounds for a claim of existence. Examine the definition of the term and the claim separately, retaining the boundary for both.

Geography

Ocean

The written word “Ocean” does not become an ocean.

What is added. If a map is added, preserve the name, image, and legend separately. The name alone supplies neither the map nor the area it depicts.

Repeat the examination. Identify the place to which the name is assigned and the data supporting that assignment. The recorded coordinates and the account of how the name was matched to the place retain the same boundary.

Astronomy

The star went out

The sentence does not become the event it describes.

What is added. If observations are supplied, preserve the time the observations were recorded, the values, and the description of how the data were obtained. The sentence about the star and the observation record remain separate materials.

Repeat the examination. Identify how this particular claim was derived from the supplied data. The words “signal,” “cause,” and “confirmed” are also subject to examination.

History

This happened

The written word “happened” does not become what happened.

What is added. If a date, authorship claim, or quotation from a document is added, preserve the supplied document, the exact passage, and the order of additions. A paraphrase and a reference to a source do not become the source itself.

Repeat the examination. Separate the account of the event from the date, origin, and status attributed to it. The record “the source is confirmed” receives the same examination.

Economics

Profit increased

The words “Profit increased” do not become the change they name.

What is added. Add the comparison period, the input values, and the calculation rule. These records change the grounds supplied for assessing the conclusion; they do not turn the sentence into the increase it names.

Repeat the examination. First examine the conclusion on its own, then with the data and the rule. Mark what was added and how the grounds for the reading changed. The recorded calculation result also retains the boundary.

Computer science

Computation complete

The line does not become the completed computation.

What is added. Present two identical lines. Add “written before the run” to one and “obtained after execution” to the other. The labels distinguish the claimed circumstances; neither label by itself presents a computation being started or carried out.

Repeat the examination. Compare the literal content, then the labels and the material supplied to check completion. If executable code is being examined, preserve the code, execution conditions, and result separately. A record can play a part in a computation; this does not make it identical to its execution as a whole.

The same questions remain in each example: what is presented here, what was added later, and what is named? Listing fields does not establish universality by enumeration alone. The records used in these examples and the explanation of their shared procedure receive the same examination.

5.3. A mathematical record remains a record

“Mathematics,” “number,” “model,” “step,” and “proof” first enter this examination as presented written forms. Preserve the formula, problem statement, and recorded inference exactly. The chosen mathematical reading is also subject to examination.

Take the teaching example “ $2 + 2 = 4$.” If definitions of the signs and rules for deriving this line are supplied, preserve them separately. These additions allow an examination of how the line is justified within the stated system. Justification does not erase the distinction between the writing, its attributed reading, and the grounds supplied.

The words “number of steps” do not become steps. A symbol for a machine on the page does not perform a computation merely by appearing. Definitions, proofs, and verification records enter the examination as presented material; accepting them as justified does not exempt them from the boundary.

The next example follows this order for P versus NP: first the recorded problem statement, then a proposed conclusion and its attributed status. Each added definition, rule, and item offered as grounds is examined within the supplied material. This order is itself presented in writing.

5.4. Application to P versus NP

The source is Stephen Cook’s problem statement. It specifies alphabets, strings, languages, and machines. P uses a polynomial step bound; NP uses a polynomial-time checking relation and a polynomially bounded witness. The appendix defines configurations and transitions; acceptance requires a finite computation ending in the accepting state. [25, pp. 1–2, 9–10] This summarizes the setup rather than reproducing its wording.

Preserve three layers for examination. First, the exact passages containing the definitions and question. Second, a separately presented record of a proposed conclusion, such as “ $P = NP$ ”; here this is a hypothetical example without a proof. Third, a status attribution, such as “this is a solution.” For the third layer, identify the conclusion it refers to, the criteria for assigning that status, and the verification material presented. Preserve the criteria and verification report separately as well. Where no proof is supplied, its name does not supply one.

Even if the inference is justified under the stated rules and accepted under the presented criteria, its writing does not become what it names. The letter “M” does not perform a computation; the words “number of steps” do not become steps; writing “solution” does not change the kind of material presented. This applies to the inference itself, not only to its later use. Definitions specify conditions for mathematical reading; writing them does not remove the boundary.

Retain the source’s qualifications too. Cook distinguishes polynomial complexity from practical feasibility using an algorithm requiring n to the power of 100 steps. [25, pp. 3–4] The problem statement should therefore not be read as unconditionally equating polynomial complexity with practical feasibility. Each claimed equivalence requires a specific passage.

This pass shows how to retain the status of a record while examining a definition, an inference, and its acceptance. It supplies no proof of equality or inequality between P and NP and identifies no contradiction in the problem statement. If “solved” is added to this pass, that attribution will also require separate grounds. This paragraph remains a record under the same conditions.

This discussion receives no exemption. The names of fields, the examples, the statement of the general boundary, and the conclusion about its application are presented here in writing. The same questions about content, order, additions, and grounds apply to them.

THE TARGET RECORD DID NOT CHANGE. LATER MATERIAL MAY DIFFER. WHERE DID THE DIFFERENCE COME FROM? NAMING A CAUSE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THE TRANSITION.

6. WHERE DOES THE NEXT READING COME FROM?

The distinction between source and inference leaves a more basic question open: why does a particular reading arise from one presented written form at all? “meaning,” “context,” “memory,” “prediction,” “emotional salience,” and “the brain” may name candidate explanations, but writing those labels does not demonstrate the transition.

Primary English pass: “me”

The primary target is “me.” This is not a novelty claim about personal deixis or indexicality: first-person dependence on speaker position, and the distinction between a stable indexical rule and context-sensitive content, are established prior work. [21,22] The narrower check is whether a name that appears when the reader takes the same written “me” to pick out different presented speakers was literally written inside the target form.

First present the prior record:

Speaker: Natasha

Then present the target separately:

me

Do not explain the reading. In a new pass present a different prior record:

Speaker: Kirill

Then present the same target separately again:

me

The written target “me” did not change. The paper also does not claim that the lexical or grammatical meaning of the first-person pronoun changed. If the reader takes “me” to pick out Natasha in one pass and Kirill in another, the names “Natasha” and “Kirill” remain in the prior speaker records; they are not written backward into “me.” The pass does not establish the “real” speaker and does not demonstrate a mechanism of deixis. It preserves the point of transition between a presented speaker position, a fixed target, and the later act of taking the target to pick out that person.

Neutral English control: same form, opposing lexical senses

The neutral control uses “sanction.” Merriam-Webster records the same spelling and pronunciation with approval/permission and punitive or coercive senses. [23] This pass checks the same boundary without relying on a first-person pronoun.

The committee gave its official

Then separately:

sanction

Do not explain the reading. New pass:

The court imposed a

Then present the same target separately again:

sanction

The target “sanction” did not change. If the word is read in a different lexical sense, the pass records a difference under a fixed target. It does not turn the label “context,” or any other explanation, into a demonstrated cause of the transition.

Additional English case: same form, different grammatical reading

A further case uses “mean.” Merriam-Webster records verb, adjective, and noun uses under the same spelling and pronunciation. [24] The written target remains fixed while grammatical role and reading can differ.

What does this symbol

Then separately:

mean

Do not explain the reading. New pass:

The average is called the

And separately again:

mean

This case is not pooled with “me” or “sanction”; it documents another way in which reading can vary while the written target remains fixed.

The causal boundary

A changed prior record and a later act of reference or lexical reading are recorded differences in presentation order. Their co-occurrence does not by itself establish the sentence “the prior record caused the result.” If the next explanation is “context selected the sense,” “the speaker fixed the referent,” “character determined content,” “memory selected it,” “the brain predicted it,” or something else, preserve that explanation as a later record. A causal account requires a separate intervention that distinguishes it from alternatives.

If a particular reader shows no shift, do not treat that absence as evidence for the opposite conclusion. That instance simply did not present a shift. Claims about prevalence or distributions across readers belong to a separate empirical study.

The English and Russian editions preserve the same boundary using examples suited to each language. The minimal cut is “I” / «я»; the name/named cut is “love” / «любовь» with recursive “feeling” / «чувство»; the primary indexical pass is “me” / «меня»; the neutral lexical controls are “sanction” / «ключ». The additional cases “mean” / «замок» are not pooled into one cross-language result.

7. CLOSEST EARLIER DISTINCTIONS

This section does not place the paper inside an inherited disciplinary frame, and it does not use predecessors as authorities. Its task is narrower: identify closely related distinctions and state exactly where the overlap ends.

Use and mention

Quine systematically distinguishes using an expression from mentioning the expression itself. That is adjacent to the refusal to confuse a word with what the word is used to discuss. The present cut, however, does not depend on quotation conventions or on classifying an occurrence as use or mention. It compares a fixed earlier record with later written material and reapplies the cut to the explanation itself. [8]

Type/token; the interpretant as a further sign

Peirce distinguished a type from a concrete token and described an interpretant as a further sign capable of generating another interpretant. This is the closest structural parallel to the recursive part of the procedure. But the present cut requires no sign–object–interpretant model, does not claim that every record must have an interpretant, and makes no inference to the sign’s object. It stops at local literal presentation. [9]

“The map is not the territory” / “the word is not the thing”

Korzybski separated maps from territories and words from the things they name. The overlap is the refusal of identity between a description and what it describes. The difference is that this paper requires no access to a “territory” and offers no general theory of abstraction. Its question is only whether later written material was literally present in the earlier record. [10]

Form and meaning in language-model research

Bender and Koller separate linguistic form from meaning in their critique of claims that systems trained only on form thereby acquire meaning. The present cut is broader in medium and narrower in inference: it makes no claim about a model’s capacity for understanding and applies to any presented written form. [11]

What is said and what is implicated

Grice distinguished what is said from conversational implicature. [17] This directly parallels the calibration in §5: content can be rationally inferred without having been separately uttered or written. The difference between the full procedures lies elsewhere: FULL STOP reapplies the cut to every later explanation and grants no terminal arbiter the power to close the transition merely by being named.

Presupposition as a distinct layer

Stalnaker and later work, including Beaver, developed explicit accounts of presupposition and background content. [18,19] The “stopped smoking” example therefore makes no novelty claim about the boundary between assertion and presupposition. It calibrates the procedure before turning to the more basic question in §6: where does a particular reading come from, and what changes it when the target written form is held constant?

Personal pronouns and deixis

Levinson treats deixis as the dependence of an expression’s interpretation on parameters of the speech situation, including participants and the speaker. Kaplan separately distinguishes an indexical expression’s stable character from content determined relative to context. [21,22] These sources are used only to identify what earlier work already established: FULL STOP does not claim to discover speaker-dependence of “me” or referent variation under a fixed indexical form. The added cut comes later: a name that appears in reading does not become literal material in the written “me,” and every explanation of why that act of reference occurred enters as another record.

Context and lexical ambiguity

Experimental work has long shown that prior semantic material can bias the processing of an ambiguous written form; a classic study used the same word ‘bank’ in different semantic neighborhoods. [20] Context-sensitive resolution is therefore prior art, not a discovery of FULL STOP. The claimed difference is procedural: each presented layer is preserved, and the same cut is reapplied to the next explanation of why the transition occurred.

Document-bounded contract interpretation

The U.S. “four corners” principle treats the document itself as the relevant field for determining meaning in the cases to which the doctrine applies, excluding extrinsic material from that interpretive step. [15] The operational overlap is real: a fixed document is kept distinct from later external material. The distinction is equally important: this is a legal doctrine of interpretation with jurisdictional scope and exceptions; FULL STOP neither determines legal meaning nor bars external evidence.

Documentary transcription and editorial intervention

Documentary transcription practices explicitly distinguish source material from editorial correction, supplementation, deletion, and other interventions. The TEI Guidelines, for example, provide separate mechanisms for a source form, a correction not present in the source, and material supplied by an editor. [16] This is a close procedural parallel to source preservation, but it is not a self-applying reader cut for every later explanation and does not impose the no-terminal-arbiter rule.

The extended boundary audit also screened work on rule-following and interpretation, the “given,” regress arguments, iterability and context, and editorial theories of text. These lines overlap with individual features but do not match the full configuration claimed here. The detailed audit is included separately in the release package.

NARROW NOVELTY CLAIM: NO EARLIER SOURCE LOCATED IN THE REVIEWED MATERIAL COMBINES THE FULL OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION OF THIS CUT. THIS DOES NOT ESTABLISH A HISTORICAL “FIRST.”

8. PREVIOUS WORK IN THIS RESEARCH LINE

The seven earlier papers are not cited as evidence that the present boundary is true. They document the sequence in which the same local ordering was applied to different forms of later attribution. The present paper makes a different move: it isolates that shared boundary itself as the object of study and as a self-applying procedure.

1. No Authority in the Output

Local cut already isolated: a generated record is separated from attributed reference, truth, authority, and permission to act. Not yet isolated there: the general reader-side cut for any presented record and any later reading.

<https://beforeword.xyz/research/no-authority-in-the-output/en/>

2. Evaluation Does Not Leave the Record

Local cut already isolated: a record-level check is separated from later inscriptions such as “evaluates,” “true,” or “equivalent.” Not yet isolated there: the general cut outside the specific act of evaluation.

<https://beforeword.xyz/research/evaluation/en/>

3. “Did You Understand Me?”

Local cut already isolated: the written forms “you,” “me,” and “understand” are separated from attributed referents and the relation of understanding. Not yet isolated there: the general recursive cut for every later explanation.

<https://beforeword.xyz/research/understanding/en/>

4. “How You Look from the Outside” Comes Later

Local cut already isolated: a particular visual record is separated from the later generalized status “view from outside.” Not yet isolated there: one rule spanning written, visual, and explanatory continuations.

<https://beforeword.xyz/research/view-from-outside/en/>

5. “MATHEMATICS REFUTED”

Local cut already isolated: a record read as mathematical is separated from attributed autonomous truth, force, application, and authority. Not yet isolated there: number and formula treated as ordinary later written forms inside a primary reader self-check. <https://beforeword.xyz/research/mathematics-phases-0-7/en/>

6. Reading as Enclosure

Local cut already isolated: self-return is separated from evidential licensing and from the order in which a ground enters the record. Not yet isolated there: a minimal self-applying procedure for readers that does not put formal machinery at its center. <https://beforeword.xyz/research/reading-as-enclosure/en/>

7. Record Boundaries

Local cut already isolated: a supplied record is separated from later attribution through source order and an explicit admissibility procedure. This is the closest direct predecessor of the present paper. The current revision removes the need to make a formal procedure or mathematical contract the judge of the primary reader-side boundary.

<https://beforeword.xyz/research/record-boundaries/en/>

SEVEN PAPERS DO NOT PROVE AN EIGHTH. THEY SHOW WHERE THE SHARED CUT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DISTRIBUTED ACROSS SEPARATE CASES.

9. NO PRIVILEGED LAST WORD

- “meaning” is a later record;
- “understanding” is a later record;
- “the brain” is a later record;
- “science proved it” is a later record;
- “mathematics showed it” is a later record;
- “an expert confirmed it” is a later record;
- “a language model verified it” is a later record;
- “peer reviewed” is a later record;
- “FULL STOP is true” is a later record.

Provenance may be retained for reproducibility, accountability, or platform requirements. Provenance does not by itself turn a sentence into what it names. Human authorship, model output, journal status, credentials, and signatures do not determine the truth of the central boundary claim.

10. SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE INSTRUCTIONS — NOT PROOF OF THE CUT

Stroop demonstrated robust interference from habitual word reading, so the procedure does not demand that a reader simply “not read.” [1] Nisbett and Wilson documented limits on verbal reports about the causes of one’s own mental processes, so a later explanation is not treated as transparent causal access. [2]

Lupyan developed the label-feedback hypothesis and presented evidence that verbal labels can alter subsequent processing. [3] Schooler and Engstler-Schooler reported verbal overshadowing of visual memory. [4] A large preregistered Registered Replication Report later found a much smaller effect with immediate description and a larger effect after a twenty-minute delay, making the role of timing explicit. [5] Here that history is used only to reject the assumption that later verbalization is necessarily a neutral copy.

Lieberman and colleagues reported changes in affective responding and amygdala activity during affect labeling. [6] That is one study, not a universal warrant for the word “feeling.” None of these sources establishes FULL STOP.

11. REPRODUCIBILITY WITHOUT AN EXTERNAL JUDGE

To repeat the central cut, preserve the exact earlier card or image and, if a later response is written down, preserve it separately together with presentation order. A checksum may establish file integrity; it does not verify “I,” breathing, feeling, consciousness, or what is happening.

If another reader produces no continuation, that is neither an error nor confirmation. If another reader produces a different continuation, that does not defeat the local record boundary. Frequency, stability, and response distributions belong to a separate study of readers.

12. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE: PRESERVE THE POINT OF TRANSITION

The cut does not itself answer what caused a reading transition. Its practical consequence is more specific: if the transition is the research object, preserving the source alone is not enough. Preserve the prior record, the target record, what appeared after it, and every later explanation of why it appeared as separate layers.

- preserve the prior record and the target record separately;
- preserve the later reading or response separately;
- preserve presentation order and the specific intervention, if any;
- preserve every later causal explanation as another layer rather than treating its label as a demonstration of the mechanism.

Source-preservation and documentary-transcription practices already separate source material from editorial additions. [16] The added layer here is different: the boundary continues into later reading and then into each explanation of why that reading appeared. The word “cause” does not terminate that sequence merely by being written.

**PRESERVING THE SOURCE IS NOT ENOUGH WHEN THE TRANSITION IS THE OBJECT.
PRESERVE WHAT CAME BEFORE IT AND WHAT APPEARED AFTER IT.**

13. WHERE A SEPARATE EMPIRICAL PROGRAM BEGINS

The moment a claim moves from “in this record” to “people,” “often,” “usually,” “changes decisions,” or “has a social effect,” the research object changes. Such claims may require participants, preregistration, ethics review or exemption, demand controls, statistical summaries, and independent replication. [7,12] Those procedures test new claims about samples and behavior; they do not retroactively determine the status of the record boundary.

“READING TOOK THE PLACE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING” IS NOT A RESULT OF THIS PAPER. IT NAMES A SEPARATE EMPIRICAL PROGRAM.

14. CONCLUSION

THE LATER MATERIAL IN READING WAS NOT LITERAL MATERIAL IN THE SOURCE RECORD. THEN IT APPEARED.

The paper does not terminate the cut with “truth,” “discovery,” “context,” “meaning,” or “the brain.” The novelty claim made in this paper remains defeasible: no earlier source located in the reviewed material contains the full operational configuration, and locating one defeats or narrows the claim. The central result is narrower: material that appears only in later reading or explanation was not literal material in the source record. The next scientific question starts at that point — what participates in bringing that later material about, and why can what appears later come to be read as content of what came before? The name of a candidate cause remains a later record. A separate intervention may provide grounds for distinguishing explanations; the record of its result retains the same boundary. The same boundary holds for every recorded inference, including a justified one: neither a definition, a proof, nor its acceptance turns the writing into what it names.

THE CUT LOCATES THE TRANSITION BOUNDARY. IT DOES NOT PRETEND TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE TRANSITION.

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These entries document the research lineage; they are not evidence that the present boundary is true.