Communications and Liberty Bill: a model for England and Wales

beforeword · legislative proposal · 30 September 2026

This is proposed legislation, not current law, a bill introduced in Parliament or a description of an existing legal immunity. It implements the package’s normative demand: no imprisonment for communication, including communication whose criminal classification is supported. It does not derive that demand merely from the distinction between words and what they name.

The proposed definitions allocate legal treatment. “Communication”, “other conduct”, “custody” and “supported” remain written stipulations requiring application to identified material. Neither their inclusion in this draft nor the bill’s title certifies the classification of a case. Communication can participate in a threat, agreement, demand or instruction; the proposal changes the permitted response without denying that objection.

Selected provisions of current law

The official revised provisions and their annotations were retrieved on 30 September 2026. These are selected provisions, not an exhaustive inventory of communication-related offences. In particular, removing imprisonment from s127 alone would leave other custodial routes intact.

S127 was fully in force by 29 December 2003, with specified-purpose commencement earlier. S181, s182 and s189 commenced on 31 January 2024 under SI2024/31. S222 and s224 commenced on 1 December 2020; the present twelve-month figure in s224(1A)(b) took effect on 18 November 2024. These dates do not retrospectively change the historical Chambers or Cobban records.

Proposed statutory text

1. Extent, application and commencement

(1) This Act extends to England and Wales and applies to persons of every age, courts and public authorities exercising powers there, including powers under common law.

(2) Sections 2–9 come into force twenty-eight days after Royal Assent. They bind the Crown. Regulations may supply administrative forms but may not postpone, narrow or create exceptions to the prohibitions.

(3) This Act may be cited as the Communications and Liberty Act 2026.

2. Interpretation

(1) In this Act “communication” means creating, possessing, storing, expressing, sending, receiving, displaying or publishing words, spoken or signed language, or other linguistic signs, in any medium, alleged to convey meaning to a person or audience; it includes causing those things to be done. Linguistic content in images or programs is included. Possession or transmission of nonlinguistic images or material is not, by itself, within this definition.

(2) Communication includes private or public material, every language, repetition, forwarding, refusals to communicate, and material characterised as threatening, fraudulent, coercive, hateful, insulting, indecent, a promise, instruction, agreement or encouragement. No such characterisation removes a communication from the scope of subsection (1).

(3) “Other conduct” means an identified act or omission of the person other than communication. A communicative demand, agreement, instruction or its attributed effect is not other conduct merely because it is described as an act, participation, complicity, conspiracy or causation. Another person’s subsequent act does not alone establish other conduct by the communicator.

(4) “Custody” includes imprisonment, detention, remand, arrest involving deprivation of liberty, secure accommodation, compulsory confinement, suspended custodial sentences, recall and coercive or punitive committal, however described. A restriction amounting to deprivation of liberty is custody regardless of its nominal form.

3. General prohibition

(1) No person may be subjected to custody for communication, its assigned meaning or the consequences attributed to it, whether or not an offence or civil wrong is established.

(2) The prohibition applies to sentence, investigation, prosecution, preventive proceedings and enforcement. It prevails over inconsistent enactments and common-law powers applicable in England and Wales.

(3) Custody must not be increased to penalise a communication component of a case containing other conduct. Communication may nevertheless be used as admissible evidence of separately alleged other conduct, subject to section 4.

(4) Existing lawful noncustodial responses are preserved subject to ordinary evidential and rights requirements and section 6. This Act does not itself validate a conviction, fine, injunction or disciplinary finding.

4. Mixed allegations and the custody record

(1) An authority seeking custody must identify the alleged other conduct, its legal basis, material supporting the allegation, the evidential standard applicable at that procedural stage, and why the proposed custody is justified for that conduct independently of penalising communication.

(2) Its record must preserve the relevant communications and surrounding exchanges, provenance, transformations, competing explanations and material adverse to its position. Participants must receive the material necessary to challenge custody; any withholding requires a reasoned judicial decision and a fair opportunity to answer its substance.

(3) A court must state findings on each disputed link, the applicable standard and the custody basis and duration attributable to other conduct. Naming an offence or asserting “conduct” does not satisfy this duty. At conviction, the criminal standard is not displaced.

(4) Before court production an arresting authority must record the section 4(1) grounds promptly; continuing detention requires the ordinarily applicable judicial safeguards. Necessary force to interrupt an independently identified imminent physical attack is not prohibited, but communication alone does not authorise confinement under that description.

(5) Where execution of a command or program is alleged to alter a system, the linguistic expression and the alleged execution and alteration must be distinguished. Execution or alteration is not established by calling the text “conduct” or merely producing the instruction. Material supporting each allegation and its attribution to the person must be recorded under this section.

5. Named consequential amendments

(1) After Communications Act 2003 s127(7), insert:

“(8) In England and Wales, liability under subsection (3) in respect of communication within section 2 of the Communications and Liberty Act is to a fine only. Cases containing other alleged conduct are subject to section 4 of that Act.”

(2) After Online Safety Act 2023 s181(5), insert:

“(6) In England and Wales, liability under this section in respect of communication within section 2 of the Communications and Liberty Act is to a fine only, whether conviction is summary or on indictment. Cases containing other alleged conduct are subject to section 4 of that Act.”

(3) After Sentencing Act 2020 s222, insert:

“222A Communications and Liberty Act restriction

No custodial sentence under this Code may be imposed, activated, extended or recalled contrary to the Communications and Liberty Act.”

6. Enforcement without conversion to custody

(1) No custody may follow non-payment of a fine, compensation, costs or other debt arising from communication, non-compliance with a communication restriction, or contempt consisting of communication.

(2) Nor may custody follow non-attendance, refusal to answer, breach of bail, community-order or procedural requirements imposed in proceedings concerning communication alone. In mixed proceedings, custody for such a breach is prohibited unless the court records that the duty, its extent and the custody basis would remain after excluding the penalised communication component. An unresolved allocation does not support custody. A derivative requirement does not become other conduct merely by reason of its breach.

(3) Subsections (1)–(2) apply regardless of wilfulness, repetition or the authority’s description of its purpose as coercion rather than punishment. Means-based payment, lawful asset enforcement and proportionate noncustodial penalties remain available; inability to pay must not attract an increased penalty. Financial sanctions and enforcement must preserve ordinary subsistence, including basic housing, food, health needs and dependants’ needs, with a reasoned determination of protected amounts and payment periods.

(4) Separately alleged violence, physical intrusion or another act is considered under section 4, not presumed from non-compliance.

7. Limited communication protection orders

(1) On an application by an affected person or prosecutor, a court may order delivery to identified recipients through specified channels to cease, where identified material establishes on the balance of probabilities that the order is necessary and proportionate to protect an identified person from the alleged impact of communication.

(2) The court must give reasons addressing alternatives, duration and the burdens on each participant. It must not require the affected person to change home, employment or ordinary activities, nor order a general internet shutdown. Voluntary arrangements chosen by that person are not prohibited.

(3) An order without notice expires within forty-eight hours unless reviewed by a judge who did not make that order, with an opportunity to answer. A final order lasts no more than thirty days; renewal requires a fresh assessment before expiry and cannot rely merely on previous renewals. Orders must not amount to custody. Breach is punishable by a means-based fine only, subject to section 6. No compulsory endorsement or apology may be required under this section.

(4) The Secretary of State must provide and fund an accessible service, using a published staff-assignment procedure, for applicants, attributed communicators and other persons on whom an order imposes duties. Funding must cover relevant copies and record preservation, translation, accessible participation, advice, challenge and correction. At an affected person’s request it must cover voluntary filtering, accompaniment and reasonable arrangements to end specified contact, without requiring surrender of ordinary activities. Assistance decisions must identify tasks, recipients and deadlines, give reasons for refusal and permit review by a different assigned officer. Funding must also cover compensation determined for an erroneous restriction. Assistance does not establish liability or promise equal effectiveness.

(5) The court must approve a reasoned list of persons to notify, identifying the material supporting attribution to the communicator, the applicant’s asserted connection and representation, and operators or others on whom duties would fall. A matching name does not suffice. Inclusion, omission and the duties proposed may be challenged; necessary corrections must be recorded and notified.

8. Review, representation and remedies

(1) An affected person may apply urgently to the court responsible for custody, or to the High Court, for release, classification under section 4 or variation of an order. Legal representation for these issues must be publicly funded where the person cannot afford it.

(2) A decision refusing release is appealable as of right to the next competent appellate court; an urgent interim application remains available. Unlawful custody under this Act gives a right to judicially assessed compensation.

9. Existing detention and sentences

(1) Custody resting on communication alone ceases to be lawful at commencement; the detaining authority must release the person promptly without requiring a prior appeal.

(2) Within seven days before commencement, authorities must identify potentially affected prisoners, detainees and suspended sentences and notify them and the responsible courts.

(3) Where another custody basis is asserted, the authority must obtain a reasoned section 4 determination within forty-eight hours of commencement, allowing representation and fixing the remaining lawful other-conduct term or ordering release. Pending determination only an already lawful, specifically recorded other-conduct basis may support detention. An unresolved allocation or administrative uncertainty supplies no custody power.

(4) Courts must formally correct mixed sentences within twenty-eight days, removing the communication penalty component. This period does not extend detention beyond the section 9(3) determination. Courts may not increase the surviving other-conduct term or impose a new financial penalty merely because this review occurs. Communication convictions are not automatically erased; their separate challenge remains available. Corresponding suspended terms and recalls must also be cancelled or corrected.

Why this wider bill is necessary

The two penalty amendments supply identifiable entry points. They cannot implement the demand alone. An offence punishable only by a fine may still provide grounds for arrest; default, procedural breach and contempt can create a later custody route. The proposal therefore addresses those powers expressly and uses a general restriction for other communication offences. The source register records the selected provisions actually read; it does not certify a completed cross-statute consequential schedule.

The strongest objection concerns deliberate threats, recurring coercive contact and instructions used in serious offending. Noncustodial restrictions may fail, and enforcement without committal may become weaker. The research package does not establish equal deterrence or guarantee safety. The proposal must make explicit who bears the costs of its response, including any burdens on the recipient. Its normative choice is to preserve liberty while retaining specific accountability and protection; this choice remains contestable even after a communication-based conviction is justified.

A mixed case requires an actual allocation: a threatening message is within the prohibition; separately alleged physical entry, assault or handling of property requires its own record. Financial loss or another person’s action cannot automatically serve as a proxy act by the sender. Conversely, the fact that testimony about an assault is written does not turn an assault allegation into a communication-only allegation. The material and asserted legal relationship must be examinable.

The selected subject is linguistic communication, including text inside images and spoken or signed language. This bill does not abolish laws governing possession of nonlinguistic images. That is an explicit legislative scope, not an exemption for the word “image” from the research boundary. Neither “program” nor “conduct” automatically settles whether a case alleges expression, system alteration or both. National-security, professional and emergency labels receive the same examination.

The proposal requires court capacity, funding for assistance and challenge, source-preserving records and scrutiny of restrictions that could reproduce confinement. The selected existing provisions include editorial notes about amendments, including prospective Code effects; their retrieval is not professional vetting of every related power or regime. Review should report repeat contact, breaches, recipient burdens, displacement to different charges, custody findings and contested releases. No empirical success rate is claimed.

Parliamentary route and reviewable next step

This belongs in a public bill. Parliament’s public-bill guidance identifies government and backbench routes; government business normally has priority. The proposed route is a government public bill, with a backbench sponsor as an alternative for advancing the text. The passage guidance requires both Houses to approve the same form; Royal Assent is required before the bill becomes an Act. The proposed twenty-eight-day commencement is a separate provision. These are institutional routes, not an assurance of adoption.

The next concrete request is for a sponsor and parliamentary counsel to review this numbered text, its costs, rights implications and complete consequential schedule while preserving the substantive ban and transition. Public-bill committee evidence can examine the custody allocation and the unresolved deterrence objection. This draft has not been introduced in Parliament. No approach to a parliamentary sponsor is recorded in this package. Legislative enactment, commencement and subsequent releases would require separate records; a written draft accomplishes none of them.